After all, the thought exercise helped Sharro come up with one solution: Rereading these works in light of the infuriating problem of the Islamic State, two discouraging findings stand out.In 1945, many civil wars were concluded after about two years.
They carry crude oil out of the fields occupied by ISIS and refined oil back into ISIS territory. A no-traffic belt would be set around ISIS territory.
These are not highways but narrow one-lane-each-way roads. S., French, Russian, or other combat planes, with a possible round of machine-gun in the sand, will have all civilian cars back away. Monitored by high-flying AWACS aircraft or the likes, with jet fighters or combat helicopters dealing with any vehicle or payload trying to cross the invisible border.
Firstly, I want to make clear that no negotiation is possible with any organization like ISIS, because the leaders, as well as the followers, are deep believers of the wahhabi-salafi creed, by which Allah has ordered them: – To spare no effort to impose sharia worldwide, – To live in the same manner as lived the early companions of the prophet Muhammad, i.e.
beard and kameez for the men, burqa for the women, – To consider a sin any occupation that is not prayer and related activities, i.e.
From Middle English percynne, from Middle French persien, from Italian persiano, from Medieval Latin Persiānus, blend of Latin Persia and Asiānus, from Ancient Greek Περσίς (Persís), from Old Persian 𐎱𐎠𐎼𐎿 (Pārsa, "Persia") (compare modern Persian پارس (Pārs)).
contributor Karl Sharro, who has made it his mission to thoroughly complicate our understanding of everything from free speech to the Iran deal to Mideast conflict to the war in Yemen, has done it again.
This time his target is what I’d call hammer-nailism: the tendency of analysts to reductively understand ISIS through the lens of their pet cause.
Hence scientists and liberals claiming that climate change caused ISIS, or a certain French economist arguing that income inequality facilitated the group’s rise.
The problem is that if they don’t then leave, to be replaced by more locally credible yet militarily able forces, they invite frustration, and risk unsustainable casualties and political if not military defeat. could very well rout ISIS quickly with a ground invasion in the short term, while leaving in place the long-term conditions that could facilitate the return of ISIS or something worse. Al-Qaeda in Iraq itself was born from the American occupation; a new occupation would produce the same kind of resistance, which ISIS or some other group could exploit. Containment, Posen wrote, “does not promise quick and easy victory.” But history suggests any victory will be slow and difficult.
This has been true even when the guerrilla forces were weak: the Taliban possesses neither planes nor significant anti-aircraft missiles, yet it has fought the United States to a stalemate, and the advantage is now shifting in its favor. After all, as MIT’s Barry Posen pointed out in The seeds of ISIS were planted in Iraq when its parent organization, al-Qaeda in Iraq, though battered, survived “the surge” of U. ground forces into the country beginning in 2007—the final and tactically most successful phase of the counterinsurgency campaign, which at its peak involved some 170,000 U. I am no specialist, only a French journalist from Egyptian upbringing and background.
In my view, air-strikes alone cannot be the solution, at least as the sole means of defeating ISIS. The solution would be a short-to-medium term strategy of strangulation, in a twin-mode operation: 1.